Abstract
Mainstream analytic epistemology regards knowledge as the property of individuals, rather than groups. Drawing on insights from the reality of knowledge production and dissemination in the sciences, I argue, from within the analytic framework, that this view is wrong. I defend the thesis of 'knowledge-level justification communalism', which states that at least some knowledge, typically knowledge obtained from expert testimony, is the property of a community and possibly none of its individual members, in that only the community or some members of it collectively possess knowledge-level justification for its individual members' beliefs. I address several objections that individuals, qua individuals, have or are able to acquire knowledge-level justification for all the beliefs they obtain from expert testimony. I argue that the problem I identify with individualism is invariant under any specific account of justification, internalist or externalist.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 417-441 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 65 |
Issue number | 260 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 25 Jun 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2015 The Author.
Keywords
- distributed knowledge
- epistemic communities
- expertise
- extendedness hypothesis
- testimony