When security games hit traffic: Optimal traffic enforcement under one sided uncertainty

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

Efficient traffic enforcement is an essential, yet complex, component in preventing road accidents. In this paper, we present a novel model and an optimizing algorithm for mitigating some of the computational challenges of real-world traffic enforcement allocation in large road networks. Our approach allows for scalable, coupled and non-Markovian optimization of multiple police units and guarantees optimality. In an extensive empirical evaluation we show that our approach favorably compares to several baseline solutions achieving a significant speed-up, using both synthetic and real-world road networks.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
EditorsCarles Sierra
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages3814-3822
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241103
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017
Event26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: 19 Aug 201725 Aug 2017

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume0
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
Country/TerritoryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period19/08/1725/08/17

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the LAW-TRAIN project that has received funding from the European Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement 653587 and in part by by a grant from the Ministry of Science & Technology, Israel & the Japan Science and Technology Agency (jst), Japan.

Funding

This work was supported in part by the LAW-TRAIN project that has received funding from the European Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement 653587 and in part by by a grant from the Ministry of Science & Technology, Israel & the Japan Science and Technology Agency (jst), Japan.

FundersFunder number
European Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation program
Ministry of Science & Technology, Israel & the Japan Science and Technology Agency
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme653587

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'When security games hit traffic: Optimal traffic enforcement under one sided uncertainty'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this