Weighted congestion games with separable preferences

Igal Milchtaich

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.009

Weighted congestion games with separable preferences

Igal Milchtaich

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

Players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences (e.g., the benefit they get from using a specific resource), their contribution to congestion, or both. In many cases of interest, intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are (additively or multiplicatively) separable. This paper considers the implications of separability for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the prospects of spontaneous convergence to equilibrium. It is shown that these properties may or may not be guaranteed, depending on the exact nature of player heterogeneity.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	750-757
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	67
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.009
State	Published - Nov 2009

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The author thanks two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 1082/06).

Funding

The author thanks two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 1082/06).

Funders	Funder number
Israel Science Foundation	1082/06

Keywords

Congestion games
Finite improvement property
Potential
Pure equilibrium
Separable preferences

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10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.009

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author = "Igal Milchtaich",

note = "Funding Information: The author thanks two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 1082/06).",

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AB - Players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences (e.g., the benefit they get from using a specific resource), their contribution to congestion, or both. In many cases of interest, intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are (additively or multiplicatively) separable. This paper considers the implications of separability for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the prospects of spontaneous convergence to equilibrium. It is shown that these properties may or may not be guaranteed, depending on the exact nature of player heterogeneity.

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KW - Finite improvement property

KW - Potential

KW - Pure equilibrium

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IS - 2

ER -

Weighted congestion games with separable preferences

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

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