Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions

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We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ (and 's-value’ in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)22-36
Number of pages15
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Early online date29 Dec 2016
StatePublished - Mar 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier Inc.


  • Network games
  • Shapley value


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