Universally composable password-based key exchange

Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi, Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Phil MacKenzie

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

182 Scopus citations


We propose and realize a definition of security for password-based key exchange within the framework of universally composable (UC) security, thus providing security guarantees under arbitrary composition with other protocols. In addition, our definition captures some aspects of the problem that were not adequately addressed by most prior notions. For instance, it does not assume any underlying probability distribution on passwords, nor does it assume independence between passwords chosen by different parties. We also formulate a definition of password-based secure channels, and show that such a definition is achievable given password-based key exchange. Our protocol realizing the new definition of password-based key exchange is in the common reference string model and relies on standard number-theoretic assumptions. The components of our protocol can be instantiated to give a relatively efficient solution which is conceivably usable in practice. We also show that it is impossible to satisfy our definition in the "plain" model (e.g., without a common reference string).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)404-421
Number of pages18
JournalLecture Notes in Computer Science
StatePublished - 2005
Event24th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2005 - Aarhus, Denmark
Duration: 22 May 200526 May 2005


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