Abstract
Adverse voter sentiment can arise when immigrants are unemployed and receive tax-financed income transfers. The explanation for unemployment however determines the consequences for the local population, and an efficiency-wage explanation for unemployment is consistent with mutual benefit to national workers and employers from the presence of unemployed immigrants receiving tax-financed income transfers. The mutual benefit requires credible labor-market disciplining through job offers to immigrants and willingness of immigrants to accept job offers. Acceptance of job offers results in displacement in employment of national workers by immigrants, which can compromise the effectiveness of efficiency wages as a counter to anti-immigrant voter sentiment in the welfare state.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1641-1655 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue number | 7-8 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Aug 2003 |
Keywords
- Immigration policy
- Unemployment
- Voters
- Welfare state
