Understanding the development of fundamentalism

Gil S. Epstein; Ira N. Gang

doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9150-4

Understanding the development of fundamentalism

Gil S. Epstein, Ira N. Gang

Department of Economics

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10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects in which leaders work to enhance their followers' observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	257-271
Number of pages	15
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	132
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9150-4
State	Published - Sep 2007

Keywords

Fundamentalism
Religion
Rent-seeking

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10.1007/s11127-007-9150-4

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Understanding the development of fundamentalism

Abstract

Keywords

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