Uncertainty, information, and the private provision of public goods

Mark Gradstein, Shmuel Nitzan, Steven Slutsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


In this paper we study private provision of public goods under imperfect information. In particular, we provide welfare analyses of information sharing and decision delay, and compare our results to the (formally similar) Cournot oligopoly model. Individuals' risk attitudes and the population size turn out to be important factors in our analysis. In contrast to the Cournot case, provided that the individuals are sufficiently risk averse, sharing information can be welfare improving; and in a large population there are less incentives to collect and disseminate information.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)449-464
Number of pages16
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Issue number3
StatePublished - Oct 1994


  • Information
  • Private provision of public goods
  • Uncertainty


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