Transfers or public good provision? A political allocation perspective

Shmuel Nitzan

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(94)90086-8

Transfers or public good provision? A political allocation perspective

Shmuel Nitzan

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Employing an extended rent-seeking model this paper focuses on the problem faced by an optimizing politician of allocating a given budget among monetary transfers to individuals, monetary transfers to groups and public-good transfers to groups.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	451-457
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	45
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90086-8
State	Published - Aug 1994

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title = "Transfers or public good provision? A political allocation perspective",

abstract = "Employing an extended rent-seeking model this paper focuses on the problem faced by an optimizing politician of allocating a given budget among monetary transfers to individuals, monetary transfers to groups and public-good transfers to groups.",

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Transfers or public good provision? A political allocation perspective

Abstract

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