Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures

Carsten Baum; Huang Lin; Sabine Oechsner

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-01950-1_18

Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures

Carsten Baum, Huang Lin, Sabine Oechsner

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

53 Scopus citations

Abstract

Ring signatures, as introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman (Asiacrypt ’01), allow to generate a signature for a message on behalf of an ad-hoc set of parties. To sign a message, only the public keys must be known and these can be generated independently. It is furthermore not possible to identify the actual signer based on the signature. Ring signatures have recently gained attention due to their applicability in the construction of practical anonymous cryptocurrencies, where they are used to secure transactions while hiding the identity of the actual spender. To be applicable in that setting, ring signatures must allow to determine when a party signed multiple transactions, which is done using a property called linkability. This work presents a linkable ring signature scheme constructed from a lattice-based collision-resistant hash function. We follow the idea of existing schemes which are secure based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem, but adapt and optimize ours to the lattice setting. In comparison to other designs for (lattice-based) linkable ring signatures, our approach avoids the standard solution for achieving linkability, which involves proofs about correct evaluation of a pseudorandom function using heavy zero-knowledge machinery.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information and Communications Security - 20th International Conference, ICICS 2018, Proceedings
Editors	Gregory Blanc, Sihan Qing, Rongxing Lu, Zonghua Zhang, Ahmed Meddahi, David Naccache, Shouhuai Xu, Pierangela Samarati
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	303-322
Number of pages	20
ISBN (Print)	9783030019495
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01950-1_18
State	Published - 2018
Event	20th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2018 - Lille, France Duration: 29 Oct 2018 → 31 Oct 2018

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	11149 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	20th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2018
Country/Territory	France
City	Lille
Period	29/10/18 → 31/10/18

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018.

Funding

C. Baum—Supported by the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography and Cyber Security in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. S. Oechsner—This work has been supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 669255 (MPCPRO). Part of work done while visiting NTT Secure Platform Laboratories.

Funders	Funder number
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme	669255
European Commission

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-01950-1_18

Cite this

Baum, C., Lin, H., & Oechsner, S. (2018). Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures. In G. Blanc, S. Qing, R. Lu, Z. Zhang, A. Meddahi, D. Naccache, S. Xu, & P. Samarati (Eds.), Information and Communications Security - 20th International Conference, ICICS 2018, Proceedings (pp. 303-322). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11149 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01950-1_18

Baum, Carsten ; Lin, Huang ; Oechsner, Sabine. / Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures. Information and Communications Security - 20th International Conference, ICICS 2018, Proceedings. editor / Gregory Blanc ; Sihan Qing ; Rongxing Lu ; Zonghua Zhang ; Ahmed Meddahi ; David Naccache ; Shouhuai Xu ; Pierangela Samarati. Springer Verlag, 2018. pp. 303-322 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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Baum, C, Lin, H & Oechsner, S 2018, Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures. in G Blanc, S Qing, R Lu, Z Zhang, A Meddahi, D Naccache, S Xu & P Samarati (eds), Information and Communications Security - 20th International Conference, ICICS 2018, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11149 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 303-322, 20th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2018, Lille, France, 29/10/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01950-1_18

Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures. / Baum, Carsten; Lin, Huang; Oechsner, Sabine.
Information and Communications Security - 20th International Conference, ICICS 2018, Proceedings. ed. / Gregory Blanc; Sihan Qing; Rongxing Lu; Zonghua Zhang; Ahmed Meddahi; David Naccache; Shouhuai Xu; Pierangela Samarati. Springer Verlag, 2018. p. 303-322 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11149 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Baum C, Lin H, Oechsner S. Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures. In Blanc G, Qing S, Lu R, Zhang Z, Meddahi A, Naccache D, Xu S, Samarati P, editors, Information and Communications Security - 20th International Conference, ICICS 2018, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2018. p. 303-322. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-01950-1_18

Towards practical lattice-based one-time linkable ring signatures

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