Towards a new portrait of the (new) Israeli soldier

This unprecedented disinterest and apathy at perhaps the most fateful moment in Israel’s 48-year history, on the occasion when the Israeli public had been conferred with more electoral strength than at any time before, can be explained by four main factors. First, tempers and rhetoric were restrained by contestants in the aftermath of the November 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin from which Israel was still reeling. Second, four suicide attacks which left over 60 people dead in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv at the end of February and the beginning of March 1996, following over ten similar attacks since the Oslo process began, clearly sapped the energies of the Israeli public. Third, the new Presidential-style system of direct election of the prime minister led both candidates to adopt putatively centrist positions - peace with security for Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu and a strong Israel with peace for Labour’s Peres - leaving little to argue about. Fourth, the de-centralization of ideology in Israeli society meant that impassioned ideological debate did not feature in the campaign. This fourth factor has ramifications extending way beyond the election itself, and requires careful consideration.