Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation

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64 Scopus citations

Abstract

We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party protocols in the face of malicious fail-stop faults, we first show how the traditional notions of secrecy and correctness of protocols can be captured as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players. Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent. In addition, we provide a simulation based notion that implies the previous three. All four notions are weaker than existing cryptographic notions of fairness. In particular, we show that they can be met in some natural setting where existing notions of fairness are provably impossible to achieve.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2011, 30th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings
Pages426-445
Number of pages20
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event30th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 2011 - Tallinn, Estonia
Duration: 15 May 201119 May 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6632 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference30th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 2011
Country/TerritoryEstonia
CityTallinn
Period15/05/1119/05/11

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