Toward Secured FPGA: Silicon Proven CLB with Reduced Information Leakage

David Zooker, Or Ohev Shalom, Yoav Weizman, Alexander Fish, Osnat Keren

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The ubiquity of FPGAs in security applications makes it imperative to design a secured configurable logic block (sCLB) that is resilient to side channel attacks. In this letter, we take a step toward secured FPGA by introducing new design circuit level methodology for the implementation of an sCLB. The security level of the sCLB is significantly enhanced by the design of its combinational part (LUT block) based on a dual-rail precharge MUX (DPMUX). The sCLB was implemented in a configurable array and fabricated in 65-nm CMOS technology. Silicon measurements proved the effectiveness of the approach. The security level was evaluated using advanced power analysis techniques. In particular, the number of secret bits that can be learned (mutual information) by a CPA attack dropped from 4 b (out of 4) after 1200 power traces for a conventional LUT design to only 2.56 b after 19.2-M power traces.

Original languageEnglish
Article number9139327
Pages (from-to)146-149
Number of pages4
JournalIEEE Solid-State Circuits Letters
Volume3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.

Keywords

  • Configurable logic block (CLB)
  • dual-rail precharge MUX (DPMUX)
  • hardware security
  • secure FPGA

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Toward Secured FPGA: Silicon Proven CLB with Reduced Information Leakage'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this