TY - JOUR
T1 - Toss one’s cake, and eat it too
T2 - Partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting
AU - Arzi, Orit
AU - Aumann, Yonatan
AU - Dombb, Yair
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.
PY - 2016/4
Y1 - 2016/4
N2 - We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good (a.k.a. "cake") between a number of players with different tastes. In this setting, it is known that fairness requirements may result in a suboptimal division from the social welfare standpoint. Here we show that, in some cases, leaving some of the cake unallocated, and fairly dividing only the remainder of the cake may be socially preferable to any fair division of the entire cake.We study this phenomenon, providing asymptotically-tight bounds on the social improvement achievable by such partial divisions.
AB - We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good (a.k.a. "cake") between a number of players with different tastes. In this setting, it is known that fairness requirements may result in a suboptimal division from the social welfare standpoint. Here we show that, in some cases, leaving some of the cake unallocated, and fairly dividing only the remainder of the cake may be socially preferable to any fair division of the entire cake.We study this phenomenon, providing asymptotically-tight bounds on the social improvement achievable by such partial divisions.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84951858618&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-015-0943-y
DO - 10.1007/s00355-015-0943-y
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SN - 0176-1714
VL - 46
SP - 933
EP - 954
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 4
ER -