Abstract
Succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) in the random oracle model (ROM) have several attractive features: they are plausibly post-quantum; they can be heuristically instantiated via lightweight cryptography; and they have a transparent (public-coin) parameter setup. The canonical construction of a SNARG in the ROM is due to Micali (FOCS 1994), who showed how to use a random oracle to compile any probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) with sufficiently-small soundness error into a corresponding SNARG. Yet, while Micali’s construction is a seminal result, it has received little attention in terms of analysis in the past 25 years. In this paper, we observe that prior analyses of the Micali construction are not tight and then present a new analysis that achieves tight security bounds. Our result enables reducing the random oracle’s output size, and obtain corresponding savings in concrete argument size. Departing from prior work, our approach relies on precisely quantifying the cost for an attacker to find several collisions and inversions in the random oracle, and proving that any PCP with small soundness error withstands attackers that succeed in finding a small number of collisions and inversions in a certain tree-based information-theoretic game.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Theory of Cryptography - 19th International Conference, TCC 2021, Proceedings |
Editors | Kobbi Nissim, Brent Waters, Brent Waters |
Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH |
Pages | 401-434 |
Number of pages | 34 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030904586 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2021 |
Event | 19th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2021 - Raleigh, United States Duration: 8 Nov 2021 → 11 Nov 2021 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 13042 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 19th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2021 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Raleigh |
Period | 8/11/21 → 11/11/21 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021, International Association for Cryptologic Research.
Funding
Acknowledgments. We thank Adi Neuman for designing the figures in this paper. Alessandro Chiesa is funded by the Ethereum Foundation and Eylon Yogev is funded by the ISF grants 484/18, 1789/19, Len Blavatnik and the Blavatnik Foundation, The Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University, and The Raymond and Beverly Sackler Post-Doctoral Scholarship. This work was done (in part) while the second author was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing.
Funders | Funder number |
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Blavatnik Foundation | |
Israel Science Foundation | 1789/19, 484/18 |
Tel Aviv University | |
Ethereum Foundation |
Keywords
- Probabilistically checkable proofs
- Random oracle
- Succinct arguments