Abstract
This paper deals with granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider two extensions-intertemporal transfers of policing funds and "fuzziness" in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 285-316 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | Journal of Population Economics |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2011 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We would like to thank participants at seminars in Bar-Ilan University, IZA, Northern Illinois University, the University of Calabria, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and the European Public Choice Society meetings for helpful comments. Financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University is gratefully acknowledged.
Funding
We would like to thank participants at seminars in Bar-Ilan University, IZA, Northern Illinois University, the University of Calabria, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and the European Public Choice Society meetings for helpful comments. Financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University is gratefully acknowledged.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University |
Keywords
- Amnesty
- Border and internal controls
- Illegal immigration
