The value of information in negotiations with incomplete information

Daphna Dor-Shifer, Rina Azoulay-Schwartz, Sarit Kraus

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

The paper considers bilateral negotiations between a buyer agent and a seller agent, where incomplete information exists on the reservation price of both agents. We analyzed a symmetrical negotiation model in which delay is the only signalling device. We determined the price an agent will be willing to pay for information on the other agent's reservation price at the beginning of the negotiation process in different situations. We also examined whether the purchase of such information was at all useful in two cases: either when both agents buy information on each other (simultaneously, or in a consecutive manner), or when the information is only available to one of the agents. We observed the effects of various parameters on the value of information and on the final outcome of the negotiation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationITRE 2006 - 4th International Conference on Information Technology
Subtitle of host publicationResearch and Education, Proceedings
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages271-276
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)1424408598, 9781424408597
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006
EventITRE 2006 - 4th International Conference on Information Technology: Research and Education - Tel-Aviv, Israel
Duration: 17 Oct 200618 Oct 2006

Publication series

NameITRE 2006 - 4th International Conference on Information Technology: Research and Education, Proceedings

Conference

ConferenceITRE 2006 - 4th International Conference on Information Technology: Research and Education
Country/TerritoryIsrael
CityTel-Aviv
Period17/10/0618/10/06

Keywords

  • Intelligent agents and mobile agents

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