This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.
|Number of pages||20|
|Journal||Games and Economic Behavior|
|State||Published - Jan 2012|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
E-mail address: firstname.lastname@example.org. 1 Research done during Ph.D. studies in the Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and in Tel-Aviv University. Research supported in part by Israel Science Foundation grants 263/03 and 212/09 and by the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions. 2 In Aumann’s model each player observes the actions of the other players but not her own. In this paper each player observes the actions of any other player including her own. Note that the two models are not equivalent (in the presence of bounded recall).
- Bounded memory
- Bounded rationality
- Bounded recall
- De Bruijn sequences
- Repeated games