The Social Cost of Rent Seeking When Consumer Opposition Influences Monopoly Behavior

G. Epstein, S. Nitzan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this chapter we present a simple version of the extended contest where the policy is determined endogenously, not by the government, but rather by one of the contestants. To clarify the relationship between this model and the existing literature and to illustrate its significance, we present the model applying a monopoly–consumer context.
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)61-69
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume19
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2002

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The Social Cost of Rent Seeking When Consumer Opposition Influences Monopoly Behavior'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this