Abstract
In many ways, Hillel and Shammai, and the ‘Houses’ they established, can be considered the beginning of what we call ‘the world of the Sages.’1 The halakhic traditions of the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai constitute the earliest and most fundamental layer of the Tannaitic literature — indeed, of the Rabbinic literature in general.2 The Houses of Hillel and Shammai are presented in the sources as distinct jurisprudential schools of thought upholding different opinions as to the law (halakha), and, less frequently, lore (Aggada). But what was the essential nature of these ‘Houses,’ and what engendered such pervasive and systematic controversy between them? In this article I will argue that the two Houses are distinct ‘schools’ not only insofar as their legal-halakhic thinking is concerned, but also in terms of their very approach to study. Indeed, the two are distinct academies (batei midrash) characterized by distinctive approaches to learning. My goal is to describe — to the extent that the sources allow this — the organizational structures, pedagogic methods, and views of the two Houses qua both halakhic schools of thought, and academic institutions. Focusing on their views as to tradition and reason as sources of knowledge.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Jewish Law Annual |
Subtitle of host publication | Volume Seventeen |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 159-208 |
Number of pages | 50 |
Volume | 17 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781134049257 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780203929766 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2008 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2007 Trustees of Boston University. All rights reserved.