The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

Eyal Baharad; Ruth Ben-Yashar

doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9378-7

The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study identifies the optimal collective decision rule in a dichotomous symmetric setting, allowing for probabilities distortion as originally assumed by Tversky and Kahneman (Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4):297-323, 1992). We show that previous results that identified the weighted majority rule as the optimal one, and did not consider subjective probabilities, are robust to such distortion in the sense that neither the rule nor the weights are changed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	53-59
Number of pages	7
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	139
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9378-7
State	Published - Apr 2009

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We thank Doron Kliger, Shmuel Nitzan, Jacob Paroush, the editor, and two anonymous referees for their useful comments and discussions. The second author acknowledges the support of the Schnitzer Foundation for Research on the Israeli Economy and Society.

Keywords

Condorcet jury theorem
Optimal rule
Subjective probabilities

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10.1007/s11127-008-9378-7

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The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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