The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art, 1948-2008

Avi Kober

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter examines the rise and fall of operational art in the Israeli armed forces. It argues that until the early 1970s the dominance of high-intensity conflicts, with their relatively favourable conditions for battlefield manoeuvre, enabled Israeli operational art to flourish. Since then, operational art became a lost art form, a trend that Israel sought to overcome by establishing the Operational Theory Research Institute in 1995, but the author maintains that the effort failed miserably because it created a postmodern theoretical construct and terminology that few could understand and relate to. Furthermore, in terms of leadership training the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) focused more on equipping commanders with managerial skills than on grooming great captains.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Evolution of Operational Art
Subtitle of host publicationFrom Napoleon to the Present
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191595806
ISBN (Print)9780199599486
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2011

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Several Contributors 2011. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • High-intensity conflicts
  • Israel
  • Israeli defence force
  • Low-intensity conflicts
  • Manoeuvre
  • Military theory
  • Operational art
  • Operational theory institute

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