TY - JOUR
T1 - The optimal size for a minority
AU - Rapoport, Hillel
AU - Weiss, Avi
PY - 2003/9/1
Y1 - 2003/9/1
N2 - We investigate a setting where uniformly altruistic members of a population, bifurcated into a majority and a minority, transact with randomly matched partners either cooperatively, thus saving transaction costs, or through a market mechanism. Externalities are introduced, whereby cooperation by members of one group and the size of that group affect the incentives to cooperate by members of the other group. Under these conditions, we determine the optimal size of the minority from its perspective, and consider the conditions under which such a size might be attained. The model provides insights on social conflicts both between groups and within groups.
AB - We investigate a setting where uniformly altruistic members of a population, bifurcated into a majority and a minority, transact with randomly matched partners either cooperatively, thus saving transaction costs, or through a market mechanism. Externalities are introduced, whereby cooperation by members of one group and the size of that group affect the incentives to cooperate by members of the other group. Under these conditions, we determine the optimal size of the minority from its perspective, and consider the conditions under which such a size might be attained. The model provides insights on social conflicts both between groups and within groups.
KW - Altruism
KW - Ethnic and religious minorities
KW - Relative group size
KW - Social conflicts
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038309681&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00195-6
DO - 10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00195-6
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AN - SCOPUS:0038309681
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 52
SP - 27
EP - 45
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
IS - 1
ER -