The leaky actuator: A provably-covert channel in cyber physical systems

Amir Herzberg; Yehonatan Kfir

doi:10.1145/3338499.3357358

The leaky actuator: A provably-covert channel in cyber physical systems

Amir Herzberg, Yehonatan Kfir

Department of Computer Science

University of Connecticut

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Strict regulations and security practices of critical cyber-physical systems, such as nuclear plants, require complete isolation between their data-acquisition zone and their safety and security zones. Isolation methods range from firewall devices, to 'data diodes' that only allow one-way communication. In this work we explore a possible threat bypassing existing isolation methods by communicating through the physical process. Specifically, we show how a corrupt actuator in one zone can send covert information to a sensor in a different zone, breaking the isolation. This may allow an attack where the actuator is intentionally malfunctioning, and the sensor is intentionally masking the malfunction. Furthermore, we show that under certain assumptions, such communication can be provably covert. Namely, it cannot be efficiently detected, by current and future detection systems. This has important implications for the design of security and safety mechanisms for critical cyber-physical systems.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	CPS-SPC 2019 - Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	87-98
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450368315
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3338499.3357358
State	Published - 11 Nov 2019
Event	5th ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC 2019, in conjunction with the 26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2019 - London, United Kingdom Duration: 11 Nov 2019 → …

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)	1543-7221

Conference

Conference	5th ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC 2019, in conjunction with the 26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2019
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	London
Period	11/11/19 → …

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery.

Funding

This research is in part supported by an endowment from the Comcast corporation. The opinions expressed in the paper are those of the researchers themselves and not of their universities or of Comcast. We would like to acknowledge Dvir Shemesh for his support in this research. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This research is in part supported by an endowment from the Comcast corporation. The opinions expressed in the paper are those of the researchers themselves and not of their universities or of Comcast. We would like to acknowledge Dvir Shemesh for his support in this research.

Funders	Funder number
Comcast corporation
Comcast

Keywords

Covert channel
Cyber physical systems
Cyber security
Intrusion detection

Access to Document

10.1145/3338499.3357358

Cite this

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Herzberg, A & Kfir, Y 2019, The leaky actuator: A provably-covert channel in cyber physical systems. in CPS-SPC 2019 - Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 87-98, 5th ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC 2019, in conjunction with the 26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2019, London, United Kingdom, 11/11/19. https://doi.org/10.1145/3338499.3357358

The leaky actuator: A provably-covert channel in cyber physical systems. / Herzberg, Amir; Kfir, Yehonatan.
CPS-SPC 2019 - Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy. Association for Computing Machinery, 2019. p. 87-98 (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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The leaky actuator: A provably-covert channel in cyber physical systems

Abstract

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Keywords

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