TY - JOUR
T1 - The king never emigrates
AU - Epstein, Gil S.
AU - Hillman, Arye L.
AU - Ursprung, Heinrich W.
PY - 1999
Y1 - 1999
N2 - This paper uses a locational model of rent-seeking to describe incentives to emigrate. A country is considered in which how a person fares in privileged income redistribution is determined by proximity to a king. Contests for privilege determine whether the more or the less productive in the population are located closer to the king. A distinction is drawn between contests for privilege that are 'easy' and 'difficult.' When contests are 'easy,' the more productive are furthest from the king and emigrate first. When contests are 'difficult,' the least productive emigrate first. In either case, the population begins to unravel.
AB - This paper uses a locational model of rent-seeking to describe incentives to emigrate. A country is considered in which how a person fares in privileged income redistribution is determined by proximity to a king. Contests for privilege determine whether the more or the less productive in the population are located closer to the king. A distinction is drawn between contests for privilege that are 'easy' and 'difficult.' When contests are 'easy,' the more productive are furthest from the king and emigrate first. When contests are 'difficult,' the least productive emigrate first. In either case, the population begins to unravel.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0032781776&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/1467-9361.00055
DO - 10.1111/1467-9361.00055
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SN - 1363-6669
VL - 3
SP - 107
EP - 121
JO - Review of Development Economics
JF - Review of Development Economics
IS - 2
ER -