The efficient and fair approval of "multiple-cost-single-benefit" projects under unilateral information

Nava Kahana, Yosef Mealem, Shmuel Nitzan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper focuses on indivisible "multiple-cost-single-benefit" projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)947-960
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume11
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2009

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