The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces.

Y. Aumann, Y. Dommb

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria — proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.
Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop (WINE)
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
StatePublished - 2010

Bibliographical note

Place of conference:Stanford, CA, USA


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