The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces.

Y. Aumann; Y. Dommb

The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces.

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria — proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.

Original language	American English
Title of host publication	Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop (WINE)
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
State	Published - 2010

Bibliographical note

Place of conference:Stanford, CA, USA

Cite this

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title = "The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces.",

abstract = "We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria — proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.",

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AU - Dommb, Y.

N1 - Place of conference:Stanford, CA, USA

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria — proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.

AB - We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria — proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.

UR - http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-17572-5_3

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop (WINE)

PB - Springer Berlin Heidelberg

ER -

The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces.

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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