The efficiency of fair division with connected pieces

Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

20 Scopus citations


We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria - proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Proceedings
Number of pages12
StatePublished - 2010
Event6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010 - Stanford, CA, United States
Duration: 13 Dec 201017 Dec 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6484 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityStanford, CA


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