The effect of risk aversion on the outcomes of inspection games

Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


In this work, we study how risk aversion behavior affects the final outcomes of inspection games. We formulate two nonzero-sum parametric games between an inspector and an agent, which are distinguished by the players' risk behaviors: risk aversion or risk neutrality. Both games are solved efficiently, and closed-form equilibria solutions are provided. The solutions of the two games are compared with each other and with a third game where both players are risk neutral. Analysis of the results reveals that the risk aversion of the agent has a stronger effect than that of the inspector, since the equilibrium strategies and utilities of both players depend on the risk aversion of the agent, whereas only the agent's equilibrium strategies and the inspector's equilibrium utility depend on the risk aversion of the inspector. Analysis of an incomplete information game version, when the agent has a private risk attitude, reveals that in order to know how to act in equilibrium, the inspector must know the probability that the agent is risk averse.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)645-660
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of the Operational Research Society
Issue number5
StatePublished - 4 May 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Operational Research Society.


  • Game theory
  • inspection games
  • risk aversion
  • risk neutrality


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