The effect of democratic decision-making on investment in reputation

Ruth Ben-Yashar, Miriam Krausz, Shmuel Nitzan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


Students wish to increase the probability of being admitted to a prestigious school. Job candidates are interested in the probability of getting desirable employment. Defendants are concerned about the probability of being acquitted. In all such binary settings, the probability of the desirable outcome to individuals can be affected by their reputations. Applying the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem framework in which decision makers are assumed to be non-strategic, we focus on how the nature of the applied decision-making rule affects the individuals’ incentives to invest in improvement of their reputations. Our main results establish that, within the family of democratic majority voting rules, simple majority rule (a rule of unanimous consent) ensures that the marginal productivity of reputation is largest (smallest) and that it increases (decreases) with the size of the decision-making committee.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)155-164
Number of pages10
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.


  • Decision-making structure
  • Investment in reputation
  • Simple majority
  • Unanimous consent


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