The dynamic assessment approach: A reply to frisby and braden

Frisby and Braden (this issue) have criticized dynamic assessment (DA), especially Feuerstein's theory and methods. The basic arguments of this reply are that (a) Frisby and Braden have tried to impose a different theoretical paradigm on Feuerstein's approach; (b) in spite of their claim, they in fact did not provide a historical context for the development of the DA approach; (c) they have neglected the philosophical assumptions behind both their approach and Feuerstein's approach; (d) they misinterpreted the structural nature of DA tasks by considering them to represent “social intelligence”; (e) they ignored recent research that supports the reliability and validity of the DA approach; and (f) they interpreted cognitive processes as personality-motivational factors and implied that static tests actually are measuring those processes. Throughout this reply, examples from recent research are given to support the DA approach, and each of the critical points raised is analyzed and discussed.