The dualism of the i a commentary on hedwig conrad-martius's realist phenomenology

This article presents the dualist perception of the T of the woman phenomenol- ogist, Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1880-1966). It is a radical attempt to critically respond to Husserl's turn towards transcendentalism. This peculiar view of the I, mosdy denoted as "I-adhering being∗ (ickhafte Sein), should be read as a remarkable refutation of one of the widespread criticisms of the phenomenological realism contemporary with Edmund Husserl concerning the lack of discussion on the issue of the ego or the I. The discussion will demonstrate that the dualism of the I that appears in the early phenomenogical study in On the Ontology and Doctrine ofAppearance of the Real External World (1916) lays the critical foundations for the more developed ontological dualism in Hedwig Conrad-Martius's later writings. My main argument is that the dualism not only signifies the structure of the I in Hedwig Conrad-Martius's philosophy but also provides the essential framework for its phenomenological deciphering, in which it transpires as a genuine philosophical problem that as such is unresolved.