Abstract
Labor-managed firms often depend on voluntary cooperation to generate efficient levels of labor input. This paper shows how cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma-like situations can be an equilibrium outcome, when rational individuals act so as to preserve reputations for cooperating. The theory developed here implies that (a) voluntary cooperation will be negatively related to population turnover, and (b) the relationship of community size to voluntary cooperation will have an inverted-U shape.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 619-632 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Journal of Comparative Economics |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 1992 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:’ This research began when I was an Olin Faculty Research Fellow at the Yale Law School, and has since been supported by a grant from the Agency for International Development to the Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) program of the University of Maryland. I thank Nava Kahana, Avi Weiss, and Michael Yalkut for helpful comments, while retaining responsibility for al1 remaining errors. ’ See Guttman ( 199 1b ) for a critical survey.
Funding
’ This research began when I was an Olin Faculty Research Fellow at the Yale Law School, and has since been supported by a grant from the Agency for International Development to the Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) program of the University of Maryland. I thank Nava Kahana, Avi Weiss, and Michael Yalkut for helpful comments, while retaining responsibility for al1 remaining errors. ’ See Guttman ( 199 1b ) for a critical survey.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| United States Agency for International Development | |
| University of Maryland |