The choice between various freeze-out procedures and its consequences

Beni Lauterbach, Evgeny Lyandres, Yevgeny Mugerman, Barak Yarkoni

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We develop a model of freeze-out merger and tender offers and test it in an economy where merger and tender regulation are extremely different. Using a relatively large sample of 329 freeze-out offers in Israel during 2000–2019, we document evidence consistent with the model. We also find that tender offers: (1) are the preferred technique; (2) offer lower premiums; and (3) suffer from a relatively large (40%) offer rejection rate. These findings diverge from U.S. evidence, and are partly due to differences in the tender offer procedures. Thus, our study illustrates that the tender offer procedure is a delicate one, and explains why Delaware has often amended it.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)315-351
Number of pages37
JournalJournal of Law, Finance, and Accounting
Volume6
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 8 Nov 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 B. Lauterbach, E. Lyandres, Y. Mugerman and B. Yarkoni

Keywords

  • Controlling shareholders
  • Going private transactions
  • Mergers
  • Tender offers

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