The Assertiveness of Israel’s Periphery Doctrine 1.0: The Benefits of the Iranian Alliance After Britain’s 1971 Gulf Withdrawal

This article analyses Israel’s diplomatic strategy in response to Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, drawing on recently declassified archival materials from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It situates Israel’s foreign policy within the broader constraints of Cold War bipolarity, showing how the periphery doctrine—Israel’s strategy of building alliances with non-Arab states on the margins of the Middle East—functioned not merely as a defensive posture but as an increasingly assertive instrument for shaping emerging regional orders. Britain’s withdrawal and the subsequent formation of the United Arab Emirates created a fluid regional environment that Israeli policymakers sought to navigate by discreetly supporting Iranian regional ambitions and exploring indirect channels of engagement with Gulf actors. The article focuses in particular on Oman, whose strategic position adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz and whose policy of studied neutrality made it a key interlocutor in Israel’s confidential Gulf diplomacy. The study concludes that Israel’s adaptive and largely covert diplomacy during this period laid important groundwork for later patterns of regional alignment, including the relationships that eventually became publicly visible with the conclusion of the 2020 Abraham Accords.