The AND-OR game

Avinatan Hassidim; Haim Kaplan; Yishay Mansour; Noam Nisan

doi:10.1145/2897186

The AND-OR game

Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for two identical items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to analyze this setting for a simple, yet highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and the other is unit demand. We find a mixed equilibrium of this game and show that every other equilibrium admits the same expected allocation and payments. In addition, we study the equilibrium, highlighting the change in revenue and social welfare as a function of the players' valuations.

Original language	English
Article number	1
Journal	ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume	5
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/2897186
State	Published - Nov 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 ACM.

Funding

Research by Avinatan Hassidim was supported in part by grants from the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) and the German Israel Foundation. Research by Haim Kaplan was supported in part by grants from the ISF, the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), the Israeli Centers of Research Excellence (I-CORE) program (center no. 4/11), and the Google Inter-university Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions. Research by Yishay Mansour was supported in part by grants from the ISF, the BSF, the Israeli Ministry of Science, the I-CORE program (center no. 4/11), and the Google Inter-university Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions. Research by Noam Nisan was supported by grants from the ISF, the I-CORE program (center no. 4/11), and the Google Inter-university Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions.

Funders	Funder number
German Israel Foundation
Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions
Israeli Ministry of Science
U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation
Israel Science Foundation
Israeli Centers for Research Excellence	4/11

Keywords

AND player
Auctions
Equilibrium
F. [theory of computation]: algorithmic game theory and mechanism design/market equilibriums
Theory

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The AND-OR game

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Bibliographical note

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Keywords

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