Temporal information design in contests

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study temporal information design in contests, wherein the organizer may, possibly incrementally, disclose information about the participation and performance of some contestants to other (later) contestants. We show that such incremental disclosure can increase the organizer's profit. The expected profit, however, depends on the exact information disclosure structure, and the optimal structure depends on the parameters of the problem. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of such information disclosure schemes as they apply to two common models of contests: (a) simple contests, wherein contestants' decisions concern only their participation; and (b) Tullock contests, wherein contestants choose the effort levels to expend. For each of these we analyze and characterize the equilibrium strategy, and exhibit the potential benefits of information design.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
EditorsSarit Kraus
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages428-434
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241141
DOIs
StatePublished - 2019
Event28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, China
Duration: 10 Aug 201916 Aug 2019

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2019-August
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
Country/TerritoryChina
CityMacao
Period10/08/1916/08/19

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. All rights reserved.

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