Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation

Gil S. Epstein, Ira N. Gang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations
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Abstract

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the taxes they pay the government. We examine the political economy of a decentralised revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralised with decentralised governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by constituencies trying to affect government taxation decisions.

Original languageEnglish
Article number101743
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume60
Early online date17 Oct 2018
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018

Keywords

  • Contests
  • Decentralisation
  • Economic-models-of-political-processes
  • Governance
  • Intergovernmental-relations
  • Rent-seeking

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