Takeover threats, antitakeover amendments and stock price reaction

Beni Lauterbach, Ileen B. Malitz, Joseph Vu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations


We examine the influence of takeover threats on the stock price of firms proposing antitakeover amendments. Stock prices of the majority of firms, which are not takeover targets during the four years surrounding the amendments, are unaffected, while prices of firms that become takeover targets within two years increase significantly. We document weak evidence of wealth losses only for a sample of prior targets. Our findings suggest that shareholders of the average firm are not harmed by antitakeover amendments because they provide either a better bargaining position or an information signal to the market.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)499-510
Number of pages12
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Issue number6
StatePublished - Dec 1991


Dive into the research topics of 'Takeover threats, antitakeover amendments and stock price reaction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this