Symmetric and asymmetric committees

Ruth Ben-Yashar, Leif Danziger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of the various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet, a symmetric composition of committees is not always optimal. In other words, decision makers with different skill levels should not generally be evenly divided among the committees. However, in the special case of only two skill levels, it is optimal to compose the committees evenly.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)440-447
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume47
Issue number4-5
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2011

Keywords

  • Collective decision making
  • Committees
  • Simple majority rule

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