STUDY‐GRANT SCHEMES AND EFFORT: AN ECONOMIC MODEL

Tikva Danish‐Lecker, Nava Kahana

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper extends Becker's basic model on investment in human capital by introducing effort as a decision variable. Based on this extended model we consider the efficiency of two popular study‐grant schemes and propose a third which unequivocally increases the student's effort and may thereby resolve the moral hazard problem created by the student's self‐interested behaviour. In addition, some policy issues concerning conflicts between the students' and the policy‐maker's objectives are discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)229-239
Number of pages11
JournalBulletin of Economic Research
Volume42
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1990

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