Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams

Leora Schmerler; Noam Hazon; Sarit Kraus

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_32

Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams

Leora Schmerler
, Noam Hazon
, Sarit Kraus

Department of Computer Science

Ariel University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However, there are many cases in which each member of M or W represents a team that consists of several individuals with common interests. For example, students may need to be matched to professors for their final projects, but each project is carried out by a team of students. Thus, the students first form teams, and the matching is between teams of students and professors. When a team is considered as an agent from M or W, it needs to have a preference order that represents it. A voting rule is a natural mechanism for aggregating the preferences of the team members into a single preference order. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams. Specifically, we assume that members of each team use the Borda rule for generating the preference order of the team. Then, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is used for finding a stable-matching, where the set M is the proposing side. We show that the single-voter manipulation problem can be solved in polynomial time, both when the team is from M and when it is from W. We show that the coalitional manipulation problem is computationally hard, but it can be solved approximately both when the team is from M and when it is from W.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Proceedings
Editors	Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros Voudouris
Publisher	Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages	562-579
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Print)	9783031157134
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_32
State	Published - 2022
Event	15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022 - Colchester, United Kingdom Duration: 12 Sep 2022 → 15 Sep 2022

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	13584 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Colchester
Period	12/09/22 → 15/09/22

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Funding

This research has been partly supported by the Israel Science Foundation under grant 1958/20, by the EU Project TAILOR under grant 952215, and by the Ministry of Science, Technology & Space (MOST), Israel.

Funders	Funder number
European Commission	952215
Ministry of Science, Technology and Space
Israel Science Foundation	1958/20

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_32

Cite this

Schmerler, L., Hazon, N., & Kraus, S. (2022). Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams. In P. Kanellopoulos, M. Kyropoulou, & A. Voudouris (Eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Proceedings (pp. 562-579). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 13584 LNCS). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_32

Schmerler, Leora ; Hazon, Noam ; Kraus, Sarit. / Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams. Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Proceedings. editor / Panagiotis Kanellopoulos ; Maria Kyropoulou ; Alexandros Voudouris. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2022. pp. 562-579 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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Schmerler, L, Hazon, N & Kraus, S 2022, Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams. in P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou & A Voudouris (eds), Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 13584 LNCS, Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, pp. 562-579, 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022, Colchester, United Kingdom, 12/09/22. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_32

Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams. / Schmerler, Leora; Hazon, Noam; Kraus, Sarit.
Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Proceedings. ed. / Panagiotis Kanellopoulos; Maria Kyropoulou; Alexandros Voudouris. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2022. p. 562-579 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 13584 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Schmerler L, Hazon N, Kraus S. Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams. In Kanellopoulos P, Kyropoulou M, Voudouris A, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Proceedings. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. 2022. p. 562-579. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_32