Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of designing a strategy profile which will enable collaborative interaction between agents. In particular, we consider the problem of information sharing among agents. Providing information in a single interaction as a response to queries is often nonbeneficial. But there are stable strategy profiles that make sharing information beneficial in the long run. This paper presents these types of mechanisms and specifies under which conditions it is beneficial to the agents to answer queries. We analyze a model of repeated encounters in which two agents ask each other queries over time. We present different strategies that enable information exchange, and compare them according to the expected utility for the agents, and the conditions required for the cooperative equilibrium to exist.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 43-93 |
Number of pages | 51 |
Journal | Artificial Intelligence |
Volume | 154 |
Issue number | 1-2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 2004 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:✩ This material is based upon work supported in part by the NSF under Grants No. IIS-9820657 and IIS-0208608. Preliminary results were reported in IJCAI-01. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Azoulay-Schwartz), [email protected] (S. Kraus).
Funding
✩ This material is based upon work supported in part by the NSF under Grants No. IIS-9820657 and IIS-0208608. Preliminary results were reported in IJCAI-01. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Azoulay-Schwartz), [email protected] (S. Kraus).
Funders | Funder number |
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National Science Foundation | |
Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering | 9820657, 0208608 |
Keywords
- Autonomous agents
- Cooperative equilibrium
- Multiagent systems
- Repeated encounters