TY - JOUR
T1 - Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
AU - Heller, Yuval
PY - 2014/3
Y1 - 2014/3
N2 - A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that "mutants" are arbitrarily rare relative to "trembling" incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.
AB - A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that "mutants" are arbitrarily rare relative to "trembling" incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.
KW - Evolutionary stability
KW - Extensive-form games
KW - Limit ESS
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893470957&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011
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AN - SCOPUS:84893470957
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 84
SP - 132
EP - 136
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -