Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that "mutants" are arbitrarily rare relative to "trembling" incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)132-136
Number of pages5
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Mar 2014
Externally publishedYes


  • Evolutionary stability
  • Extensive-form games
  • Limit ESS


Dive into the research topics of 'Stability and trembles in extensive-form games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this