Speed limits

Artyom Jelnov, Doron Klunover

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a model in which a regulator determines the level of an activity – which is harmful to society – beyond which an agent will pay a fixed fine. We show that the regulator adopts a random punishment scheme under certain conditions in order to minimize harm. The results may help to solve the puzzle of why vague enforcement policies are implemented by competent governments even when tough enforcement is possible and costless.

Original languageEnglish
Article number110368
JournalEconomics Letters
StatePublished - Apr 2022
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.


  • Law enforcement
  • Random strategy


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