Socrates, Divine Worship, and the Good Ruler in Part III of Halevi's Kuzari

Judah Halevi's KUZARI is generally understood as, INTER ALIA, a critique of philosophy, admitting at best that PHILOSOPHIA ANCILLA THEOLOGIAE EST. Yet, as is sometimes noted, philosophy makes appearances throughout the work, often where least expected. One such place is in Halevi's two-part description of the ideal Jewish person at the beginning of Part III. There Halevi describes two types of ideal: the true worshipper (AL-MUT'ABBID) and the good ruler (AL-HAYYIR, AL-RA'IS). Although scholars and translators are wont to lump these two ideals into one, Halevi quite clearly differentiates them, even while drawing on Plato's works for both. The second, the good ruler, is a kind of microstate: he rules his psychological and bodily faculties in such a way that he is fit to rule Israel as one body. This rule is in accordance with intellect as well as with the divine law; indeed, according to the Haver, the good ruler uses Biblical images as imitations of the divine intelligibles. This good ruler thus seems to be a kind of philosopher-king, making the people of Israel one body governed by Intellect. The true worshipper, in contrast, is not a ruler and indeed separates himself from the community. He strives to connect himself to the divine, in the manner attributed to the philosopher in Part I, and even longs for death so as to join most fully with God. Halevi associates this kind of worship with the prophets, naming three examples explicitly: Enoch, Elijah, and Socrates. While the inclusion of Socrates here accords with his depiction in medieval Arabic literature, it also suggests that a non-Jew could attain the highest form of divine worship. Here I argue that both accounts apparently make the ideal Jew a philosopher, even though they give two depictions of a philosopher: an isolationist and a philosopher-ruler. The Haver clearly indicates that the isolationist is preferable, but no longer attainable. He thus thrusts the philosopher into ruling the Jewish polity and makes Jewish religious texts into allegories for philosophy. Why, then, is Halevi's account here so different from his critique of philosophy in Parts IV and V?