Social compromise and social metrics

D. E. Campbell, S. I. Nitzan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the context of constitutional design, a committee of citizens' representatives proposes (social choice) axioms. The outcome should not necessarily be the aggregation rule, or rules, satisfying each of the axioms. Alternative procedures are recommended for aggregating a set of axioms into a single summary axiom. The summary axiom generates a single social decision function when a social metric is applied.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-16
Number of pages16
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume3
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1986

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