Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants

Nava Kahana; Doron Klunover

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010

Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants

Nava Kahana, Doron Klunover

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players to show that, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	126-129
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	163
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010
State	Published - Feb 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Aggregative games
Sequential contests
Subgame perfect equilibrium

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10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010

Cite this

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title = "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants",

abstract = "We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players to show that, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.",

keywords = "Aggregative games, Sequential contests, Subgame perfect equilibrium",

author = "Nava Kahana and Doron Klunover",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2018",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010",

language = "אנגלית",

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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