Semi-honest adversaries

Carmit Hazay; Yehuda Lindell

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_3

Semi-honest adversaries

Carmit Hazay, Yehuda Lindell

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this chapter, we present Yao’s protocol for secure two-party computation in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. The protocol has a constant number of rounds, and works by having the parties evaluate an “encrypted” or “garbled” circuit such that they learn nothing from the evaluation but the output itself. In particular, all intermediate values in the circuit evaluation (which can reveal more information than is allowed) remain hidden from both parties. We present the protocol for the case of a deterministic, non-reactive, single-output functionality. As we have shown in Section 2.5, this suffices for obtaining the secure computation of any probabilistic, reactive two-party functionality at approximately the same cost.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security and Cryptography
Publisher	Springer International Publishing
Pages	53-80
Number of pages	28
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_3
State	Published - 2010

Publication series

Name	Information Security and Cryptography
Volume	15
ISSN (Print)	1619-7100
ISSN (Electronic)	2197-845X

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2010, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_3

Cite this

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Semi-honest adversaries

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