Selective opening security for receivers

Carmit Hazay; Arpita Patra; Bogdan Warinschi

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_19

Selective opening security for receivers

Carmit Hazay, Arpita Patra, Bogdan Warinschi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adversary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 - 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 2015, Proceedings
Editors	Jung Hee Cheon, Tetsu Iwata
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	443-469
Number of pages	27
ISBN (Print)	9783662487969
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_19
State	Published - 2015
Event	21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2015 - Auckland, New Zealand Duration: 29 Nov 2015 → 3 Dec 2015

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	9452
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2015
Country/Territory	New Zealand
City	Auckland
Period	29/11/15 → 3/12/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2015.

Funding

Carmit Hazay acknowledges support from the Israel Ministry of Science and Technology (grant No. 3-10883). Arpita Patra acknowledges support from project entitled ‘ISEA - Part II’ funded by Department of Electronics and Information Technology of Govt. of India. Part of this work was carried out while Bogdan Warinschi was visiting Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK and IMDEA, Madrid, Spain. He has been supported in part by ERC Advanced Grant ERC-2010-AdG-267188-CRIPTO, by EPSRC via grant EP/H043454/1, and has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement 609611 (PRACTICE).

Funders	Funder number
Department of Electronics and Information Technology of Govt
IMDEA
ISEA
Seventh Framework Programme	609611
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council	EP/H043454/1
European Commission
Seventh Framework Programme
Ministry of science and technology, Israel	3-10883

Keywords

Encryption schemes
Noncommitting encryption
Selective opening attacks

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_19

Cite this

Hazay, C., Patra, A., & Warinschi, B. (2015). Selective opening security for receivers. In J. H. Cheon, & T. Iwata (Eds.), Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 - 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 2015, Proceedings (pp. 443-469). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9452). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_19

Hazay, Carmit ; Patra, Arpita ; Warinschi, Bogdan. / Selective opening security for receivers. Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 - 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 2015, Proceedings. editor / Jung Hee Cheon ; Tetsu Iwata. Springer Verlag, 2015. pp. 443-469 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adversary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.",

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Hazay, C, Patra, A & Warinschi, B 2015, Selective opening security for receivers. in JH Cheon & T Iwata (eds), Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 - 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9452, Springer Verlag, pp. 443-469, 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2015, Auckland, New Zealand, 29/11/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_19

Selective opening security for receivers. / Hazay, Carmit; Patra, Arpita; Warinschi, Bogdan.
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 - 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 2015, Proceedings. ed. / Jung Hee Cheon; Tetsu Iwata. Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 443-469 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9452).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Hazay C, Patra A, Warinschi B. Selective opening security for receivers. In Cheon JH, Iwata T, editors, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 - 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 2015, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 443-469. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_19

Selective opening security for receivers

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